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TORTS-STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY -RECOVERY

FOR EMOTIONAL

California Court of Appeals has held that a cause of
action may be maintained in strict liability for physical injuries
resulting from emotional shock suffered in witnessing injuries or
death inflicted upon a close family member as the result of a defectively designed or manufactured product.
DISTRESS-The

Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612
(1977).
On October 17, 1976, a Ford Pinto wagon, in which the Shepard
family was traveling, was negligently struck on the left side by another auto when the driver of the second vehicle lost control.' Upon
impact, the rear hatch door of the Pinto wagon opened and the two
Shepard children, who were riding in the rear carrying area, were
thrown onto the highway The second auto struck and killed the
Shepards' daughter, Jean.'
Charging the Ford Motor Company (Ford) with the defective
manufacture and design of the hatch door lock, the plaintiffs filed
a complaint in the California Superior Court, county of Alameda,
seeking damages for wrongful death, emotional distress and bodily
injuries.' In order to obtain the requested relief, the complaint advanced the alternative theories of negligence, breach of express and
implied warranties and strict tort liability.' Ford filed a demurrer7
to those causes of action for emotional distress brought in strict
liability, as well as those based upon express and implied warranties. Ford maintained that damages for the emotional distress and
resulting physical injuries experienced in witnessing the death of a
close relation were recoverable on a negligence theory only." Agree1. Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 18-19, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612, 613-14.
2. Id. at 19, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
3. Id.
4. Plaintiffs in the case included the parents of the victim, Mr. Vernon F. Shepard and
Mrs. Gloria I. Shepard, and their son Vernon F. Shepard, III.
5. Brief for Plaintiff at 1-17, Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr.
612 (1977).
6. Id.
7. Defendant's Demurrer at 3, Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 612 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Defendant's Demurrer].
8. Ford believed that the plaintiffs' cause of action for emotional distress was governed
by the negligence principles set forth in Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 72 (1968). The Dillon court disregarded both the impact rule and zone-of-danger requirement and held that foreseeability of risk was the basis for liability. The foreseeability
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ing that the cause of action must be grounded in negligence, the
superior court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.' The
plaintiffs then sought a writ of mandate from the California Court
of Appeals to compel the lower court to vacate its order sustaining
the demurrer. Issuance of the writ of mandate was granted'" because
the appellate court concluded Ford owed a duty to the plaintiffs on
the additional theories of strict liability and warranty."
A majority of the court, speaking through Justice Taylor, placed
great emphasis on the landmark case of Dillon v. Legg 2 to permit
the claim for emotional distress in strict tort liability. 3 In Dillon the
California Supreme Court eliminated the zone-of-danger requirement and instituted a foreseeability test as determinative of liability in the emotional distress area. 4 By isolating this foreseeability
concept and analyzing it in light of prior California products liability decisions, the Shepard court found major support for creating
the new cause of action. 5 First, the majority noted that foreseeability had been used by the California Supreme Court in Elmore
v. American Motors Corp.'" to extend the doctrine of strict liability
to encompass physical injuries directly inflicted upon bystanders.
Second, the California Supreme Court's decision in Cronin v. J.B.E.
element permitted the court to uphold a cause of action for physical injuries flowing from a
mother's emotional trauma when she witnessed the death of her child from outside the zoneof-danger. Ford argued that Dillon's ruling was specifically limited to negligence actions.
Defendant's Demurrer at 4.
9. Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977).

10. Id.
11. Ford petitioned for a hearing in the Supreme Court of California, but the petition was
denied on February 16, 1978.
12. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
13. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 19, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
14. Prior to the Dillon decision, a third party claiming damages for emotional distress and
resulting physical injuries was required to be within the zone of imminent danger. This
requirement meant that the third party had to actually be situated within the area of physical
impact and fear for his own safety. Application of the rule to the Dillon factual situation
would have resulted in the denial of a cause of action to the victim's mother, since she
witnessed the death of her child a few yards outside of the prescribed zone-of-danger. To
amend that which the California Supreme Court considered an inequitable result, the foreseeability of risk approach was developed and the mother was granted a cause of action. 68 Cal.
2d at 731-32, 441 P.2d at 915-16, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75-76.
15. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 19, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 614-15.
16. 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969). In Elmore, the Supreme Court
of California reasoned that although consumers and users of a product have the opportunity
to inspect for defects and to limit their purchases to products sold by reputable manufacturers, the bystander cannot avail himself of such protective measures. Thus, the court found
that a bystander whose injuries resulted from a defective product should be entitled to greater
protection than that afforded to a user or consumer.
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Olson Corp.'7 was cited for its recognition that the injury in both
negligence and strict liability cases must be reasonably foreseeable.
Finally, the majority relied upon Horn v. General Motors's in which
the California Supreme Court required manufacturers of automobiles to consider the possibility of accidents and resulting foreseeable injuries.
These cases illustrated to the Shepard court that foreseeability
had been the touchstone previously used to develop and enlarge the
scope of liability in strict products liability actions. This foreseeability concept also enabled the court to base the claim for emotional
trauma in strict liability, since the court reasoned emotional distress was as foreseeable a consequence of an accident involving a
defective automobile as was direct physical injury." Furthermore,
the court noted that the California Supreme Court had decided in
Jiminez v. Sears Roebuck & Co.10 that a plaintiff in a products
liability action could seek recovery on the multiple theories of strict
liability and negligence for directly inflicted physical injuries. The
Shepard court believed that this multiple theory rule for recovery
could be logically extended to plaintiffs who suffered indirect physical harm as a result of emotional shock. 2' Finally, authorizing recovery for claims of emotional trauma within the strict liability framework was, the majority concluded, not inconsistent with California's
established policy reasons for originally adopting the theory.2
In dissenting, Justice Kane acknowledged the benefits of the
strict liability policy arguments concerning loss-distribution and
injury-reduction;U nevertheless, he reminded the court that a man17. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). Although the court in Cronin
eliminated from a plaintiff's burden of proof the unreasonably dangerous element of § 402A
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs, it did not intend that the term defect remain undefined in jury instructions in products liability actions. Rather, the court contemplated that
the accumulated body of products liability authorities would offer assistance in formulating
a definition. Id. at 130 n.16, 501 P.2d at 1162 n.16, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442 n.16.
18. 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976) (where horn assembly of a station
wagon was defectively designed or manufactured so that it caused the motorist to sustain
greater than usual injuries in a collision, both the manufacturer and distributor held liable
for the additional aggravated injuries).
19. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 22, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
20. 4 Cal. 3d 379, 482 P.2d 681, 93 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1971) (plaintiffs in a products liability
action entitled to proceed on a negligence theory as well as a strict liability theory).
21. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 22, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
22. Id. Policy dictated that the plaintiffs be relieved of the problems of proof inherent in
negligence and warranty actions and also that the manufacturer bear the costs of injuries
resulting from a defective product. Id.
23. Id. at 28, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 619 (Kane, J., dissenting).
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ufacturer is not to be an insurer of his product.24 Kane believed that
basing a claim for emotional trauma in strict liability is a significant
step toward tie adoption of absolute liability. 5 Moreover, he
charged that the majority's decision would ultimately have counterproductive effects by hampering and arresting, rather than promoting, the policy objectives of the strict liability doctrine. 2 Since manufacturers would experience higher insurance rates, the added expenses of safety measures and rising costs resulting from the deluge
of law suits, they would inevitably be forced to pass on the ensuing
loss to the public in the form of higher consumer costs and diminished availability of quality products." Most importantly, Justice
Kane perceived an adverse effect on the overall economy in terms
of jobs and solvency of businesses.28 As a matter of judicial policy,

therefore, he would halt the further extension of strict liability principles to entrepreneurs. 9
Finally, Justice Kane asserted that a curbing of strict liability
should at least occur in areas such as emotional distress where damages are speculative and conjectural.? Noting that recovery in strict
liability had consistently been limited to those instances in which
definite physical injury had occurred," Kane urged continued ad24.

Id. at 29, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 620.

25. Id.
26. Id. at 28, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 619. Kane acknowledged that consumer benefit and protection were the original underlying policies that favored the adoption of strict liability. Manufacturers were held liable for defective products since they could discover and correct the
dangerous aspects before injury occurred. Additionally, they were able to protect themselves
by obtaining insurance and dispersing any increased cost by raising the price of the products.
Yet, Kane seriously questioned the continued viability of these policy reasons. Economic
realities, he stated, indicated that it was increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to make an
absolutely safe product on the one hand and to spread the cost on the other. Id. at 28-29, 142
Cal. Rptr. at 619-20.
27. Id. at 29, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 620 (Kane, J., dissenting).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. Proving emotional distress and resulting physical injuries allegedly caused was,
Kane declared, an extremely difficult task due to the inherently elusive and intangible nature
of the ailment. In support of his assertion, he pointed to medical studies conducted in the
area which indicated that psychic stimuli could account for the injuries experienced in only
a small, insignificant number of cases. Id. at 25, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 617-18 (Kane, J., dissent-

ing).
31. To substantiate his view that strict liability was designed to encompass only physical
injury, Justice Kane relied upon the definition given the word "injury" in prior case law and
secondary source materials. He pointed out that the initial use of the word "injury" in
Greenman v. Yuba, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), had been consistently interpreted to mean physical injury. See, e.g., Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt,
385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967). Most importantly, he noted that the definition was stated in
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herence to this established principle. He concluded, therefore, that
claims for infliction of emotional distress to third parties should be
restricted to negligence actions. 32 This solution would provide the
injured plaintiff with an adequate mode of recovery,3 and likewise
prevent the manufacturer from incurring absolute responsibility for
his product. 34 Prior to Shepard, American courts had proceeded
slowly and cautiously in providing a claim to third parties for emotional distress and resulting physical injuries. Courts repeatedly
expressed the concern that extending liability to cover such injury
would result in numerous fraudulent claims and liability disproportionate to the negligent acts of defendants. 5 Initially, recovery was
restricted to those situations in which the emotional injury was
caused by a physical impact. The impact rule not only operated to
effectively limit the scope of liability, but also severely restricted the
incidence of fraudulent claims.36 This rule was eventually relaxed to
permit recovery if the plaintiff were within the zone of imminent
danger.3 7 No longer did the plaintiff have to experience actual imthe California Supreme Court case of Seely v. White Motors Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145,
45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). Seely specifically held that strict liability was intended to embrace
actions for physical injury only, although claims for economic loss were more appropriately
handled under warranty principles. Finally, Kane examined the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF

TomRs § 402A, and concluded that it also supported his position: § 402A provides that a
manufacturer is to be held liable for the "physical harm" caused by a defective product. Id.
at 22-23, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 616 (Kane, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 25-26, 142 Cal. Rptr. 618-619 (Kane, J., dissenting). While negligence requires
proof of the defendant's fault, this element is not present in a strict liability action. History
and legal policy, claimed Kane, clearly indicated the reluctance of courts to hold the tortfeasor liable for infliction of emotional distress in the absence of culpable conduct. He further
noted that the Dillon court was well aware of this policy, and emphasized the need to base
claims for emotional distress upon the adjudicated fault and liability of the defendant. Kane
viewed Dillon as explicitly holding that the fault of the defendant is an indispensable element
in an action brought for emotional distress.
33. Id. at 29 n.3, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 620 n.3 (Kane, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 31, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 622 (Kane, J., dissenting).
35. See Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935) (person out of range of
ordinary physical peril could not recover for physical injuries that resulted from the shock of
witnessing another's danger). See generally Note, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress:
Reaction to Dillon v. Legg in California and Other States, 25 HASTiNGS L.J. 1248 (1974).
[hereinafter cited as Mental Distress].
36. See Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) (where no immediate
personal injury occurs, recovery for injuries resulting from emotional shock not permitted);
Miller v. Baltimore & O.S.W. R.R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908) (recovery not permitted for fright, terror, alarm, anxiety or distress of mind when unaccompanied by some actual
physical impact). See also 3 PERSONAL INJURY § 3.04 [b][i] (1965).
37. See 3 PERSONAL INJURY § 3.04 [b][i] (1965). See generally Mental Distress, supra
note 35; Rintala, Status Concepts in the Law of Torts, 58 CAL. L. REv. 80, 106-19 (1970).
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pact in order to recover; he need only be situated so as to reasonably
fear for his own.safety. In the seminal case of Dillon v. Legg, the
California Supreme Court eliminated the zone-of-danger rule, characterizing it as an arbitrary and ineffective guideline for determining the scope of liability.3 ' The court in Dillon adopted the position
that liability should be imposed in those instances in which the
plaintiff's injury was foreseeable to the defendant at the time of his
negligent act. Three requirements were established by the Dillon
court for determining whether or not the injury to the plaintiff was
foreseeable-namely, the plaintiff's proximity to the accident scene,
the plaintiff's sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident resulting in a direct physical impact, and the plaintiff's relationship to the victim.' 0 Additionally, the court limited recovery to
those cases in which the plaintiff suffered actual physical harm as
a result of witnessing the infliction of injury or death upon a close
family member." These requirements imposed by the Dillon court,
although more liberal in scope than the impact and zone-of-danger
restrictions, still permitted the court to control liability and dispose
42
of unfounded claims.
38. See Cook v. Maier, 33 Cal. App. 2d 581, 92 P.2d 434 (1939) (recovery for physical
injuries resulting from emotional trauma permitted where plaintiffs geographic position
caused her to reasonably fear for her own safety).
39. Had this zone-of-danger rule been applied in the Dillon case, a cause of action would
have been denied to the victim's mother. Although she witnessed her child's death, she was
not exposed in any manner to physical injury. On the other hand, the victim's sister, who
was within the zone-of-danger and feared for her own safety, would have been permitted to
sustain a claim. This prompted the court to write: "In the first place, we can hardly justify
relief to the sister for trauma which she suffered . . .and yet deny it to the mother merely
because of a happenstance that the sister was some few yards closer to the accident. The
instant case exposes the hopeless artificiality of the zone-of-danger rule." 68 Cal. 2d at 731,
441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
40. Id. at 736, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
41. See Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1977). In
Justus, husbands who were present in the delivery room when the attending physician announced that fetuses had died were not permitted to recover for negligent infliction of emotional harm. The deaths of the fetuses were hidden from the husband's contemporaneous
perception. Furthermore, a wrongful death action could not be maintained for the deaths of
the stillborn fetuses since a fetus is not a "person" within the meaning of the wrongful death
statute. See also Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr.
302 (1977) (a child has no nonstatutory cause of action in negligence for loss of parental
consortium and such denial does not deprive the child of equal protection); Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977) (an action for emotional distress
and resulting physical injuries requires sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident but does not demand actual visual perception of the death or injury causing impact by
the plaintiff).
42. See generally 4A PERSONAL INJURY § 1.04 [5][c][v] (1969). See also note 41 supra.

1978-79

Recent Decisions

Notably, Dillon and the prior cases which developed the cause of
action for infliction of emotional distress had been based upon negligence principles and consequently required the plaintiff to bear the
burden of proving the defendant's initial fault. This consideration
provided a measure of safety, since recovery was barred if the defendant's negligence was not established, or if the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. 3
The Shepard case, however, represents the initial attempt by any
court to permit recovery for the infliction of emotional distress in a
strict products liability action. The immediate practical significance of Shepard is readily apparent in the relaxation of the burden
of proof necessary for the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of
emotional distress. Since the focus of a strict liability action is directed at proving the defect of the product and the causation of the
injury," the necessity of establishing the defendant's fault is instantly eliminated. Furthermore, the defenses of due care and contributory negligence, which serve as liability limiting factors in negligence actions, are completely unavailable to the defendant in a
products liability suit. 5 By extending the claim for emotional
trauma into the strict liability area, the Shepard court has implicitly eradicated several carefully circumscribed safeguards that
courts had relied upon in originally permitting recovery for emotional distress. Consequently, by easing the plaintiff's burden of
proof in this manner, the Shepard court has considerably expanded
the scope of an otherwise conservatively evolving tort." Nevertheless, the Shepard majority believed that the problems of extensive
liability and fradulent claims could be averted by imposing the
7
Dillon determinants of foreseeability.4
It appears, however, that the majority's reliance upon the Dillon
foreseeability approach is seriously misplaced. Dillon was decided
in a negligence setting, and the court stressed the defendant's duty
of due care. 4 The foreseeability of risk approach discussed in Dillon
43. The court in Dillon fully recognized this limitation by emphasizing that the contributory negligence on the part of the mother, sister or victim would result in a denial of recovery
for emotional distress; if contributory negligence were discovered, it would negate the defendant's liability for the child's death. 68 Cal. 2d at 732, 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
44. R. HURSCH & H. BAILEY, AmnicAN LAw OF PnoDucTs LIABiLrrY § 4:10 (1974).
45. Id. at § 4:34.
46. See text accompanying notes 35-42 supra.
47. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 20, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
48. 68 Cal. 2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76. In abrogating the zone-of-danger
rule and establishing the foreseeability of risk approach as determinative of the defendant's
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was actually an attempt by the California Supreme Court to define
the defendant's duty in order to construct safeguards against the
potentially infipite liability problems posed by claims for emotional
distress.4 9 In the Dillon court's sense of the term, foreseeability is
apparently incompatible with strict liability concepts. Foreseeability in the strict liability context, to the extent that it is even
appropriate to use the term in a strict liability setting, has been
generally recognized as the use that an objective reasonable man
might perceive for the product.2 The defendant's conduct, his ability to perceive the risk involved and his attendant duty have no real
significance. Yet, the Shepard court failed to recognize this incongruity and extracted the foreseeability test from Dillon without first
considering the surrounding negligence implications. Additionally,
the majority inexplicably overlooked the specific language in Dillon
which restricted claims for emotional distress to negligence actions.5 ' Therefore, the Shepard court's transferral of the negligenceoriented foreseeability of risk approach into the strict products liability arena reveals the court's insensitivity to the underlying principles of the strict tort liability theory. In light of these factors, the
criticism leveled by Justice Kane is not unwarranted; the extension
of a claim for emotional distress in strict liability can indeed be
characterized as illogical and unreasonable if it is merely premised
upon the foreseeability rationale .52
The most convincing reason advanced by the majority in support
of its decision in Shepard emanates from the court's express recognition that its conclusion is in accordance with California's progressively liberal products liability philosophy. 5 Beginning with the
liability in an action for emotional distress, the Dillon court specifically indicated that such
claims were premised upon the defendant's culpability. The court stated: "The basis of such
claims must be adjudicated liability and fault of the defendant; that liability and fault must
be the foundation for the tortfeasor's duty of due care to third parties who, as a consequence
of such negligence, sustained emotional trauma." Id.
49. Id. at 737, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
50. See 2 DooLEy, MODERN TORT LAW § 32.80 (1977); 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODucTs LtAiuTy § 16A [41[d] (1978).
51. See note 48 supra.
52. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
53. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 22, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 615. In the concluding paragraph of the
majority opinion, the court acknowledged that the creation of a new cause of action for
emotional distress in strict products liability is consistent with past California products law.
The court observed: "Our conclusion is in consonance with the stated purpose of the courts
in adopting the doctrine of strict liability, i.e., 'to relieve the plaintiff from problems of proof
inherent in pursuing negligence . . . and warranty . . . remedies, and thereby to insure that
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prominent 1963 case of Greenman v. Yuba,5 which conceived of the
strict products liability theory and eliminated the evidentiary burdens inherent in negligence actions, the California courts have consistently displayed a particular sensitivity for the plaintiff's position. Greenmanrequired only that the plaintiff establish a defective
product that caused the alleged injury. The ultimate responsibility
to guard against production and marketing of defective items was
assigned to the manufacturer, who possessed the greater technical
and financial ability. 5 The consumer's burden of proof being eased,
he was better equipped to plead his case and recover. Subsequent
product liability suits in California have relied upon the Greenman
language and adhered to its policy of simplifying and relaxing the
plaintiff's burden of proof.5 6 In Cronin v. JB.E. Olson,5 the California Supreme Court expressly articulated this unique concern for the
plaintiff's position when it stated that one of the chief underlying
factors for adopting a strict liability approach was to relieve the
plaintiff from the problems of proof inherent in pursuing negligence
and warranty remedies.s In keeping with this liberal approach, the
the cost of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers.
Id.
54. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1964). The Vandermark decision not only reaffirmed and clarified the Greenman doctrine of strict liability, but also extended it by holding that a manufacturer cannot escape
strict tort liability by proving that a dealer or component part designer was responsible for
the defect. When evidence exists that the dealer is required by the manufacturer to make
final inspection of the product, the manufacturer is yet responsible for any defective condition
and resulting injuries. Seeley v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17 (1965).
Analyzing the Greenman language, the Seeley court held that claims for property damages
were restricted to the warranty setting and claims for personal injuries were more appropriately brought under the strict tort liability theory. In Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70
Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969), the court permitted a bystander whose
injuries resulted from a defective product to bring a claim under the strict liability theory
espoused in Greenman. In Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr.
178 (1970), recognizing the broad Greenman philosophy, the California Supreme Court applied strict liability to bailors and lessors of property, finding that it made no difference
whether or not the party distributing the article retained title to it. In Luqueu v. McLean, 8
Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972), the court determined that although
the injured plaintiff in a strict product liability case is required to prove the product's defect
which proximately caused his injuries, he does not also have to prove his awareness of the
defect at the time of the injury. Such a burden, the court concluded, was never imposed by
the Greenman strict liability doctrine.
57. 8 Cal. 3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
58. The recent decision of Barker v. Lull Eng'r. Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal.
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primary concern of the Shepard court was apparently to provide
relief for the plaintiff injured by a defective product. Instead of
restricting the 9 laim for emotional trauma to negligence principles,
the court created an entirely new cause of action for the plaintiff in
strict liability in order to accomodate his needs. 9
If the Shepard court had openly acknowledged and emphasized
California's philosophy to simplify and relax the plaintiff's burden
of proof, it would have facilitated an understanding of the court's
enlargement of the scope of recovery in the emotional distress area
where changes previously had been achieved only after years of
cautious and deliberate thought. In Shepard, however, there was a
noticeable absence of any thoughtful elaboration and analysis and
no discussion of the ramifications of such a far-reaching decision.
Consequently, the parameters of the decision may need to be defined by subsequent case law before other jurisdictions will adopt
the position taken by the California court. While the evolution in
this area remains in some jurisdictions at the zone-of-danger test,10
California has surged ahead by extending the development of a
claim for emotional trauma into the strict liability arena.
Marilyn Sydeski
Rptr. 225 (1978), clearly illustrates California's desire to ease the plaintiff's burden of proof
in strict products liability suits. In Barker, California adopted an approach more liabilityoriented than any other previously advanced approach. Barker actually shifts the burden of
proof from the plaintiff to the defendant manufacturer in those instances in which a design
defect is alleged. Once the causal relationship between the design and the injury is established, the defendant must bear the burden of refuting the product's defectiveness. Id.
59. 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977).
60. See notes 37-38 supra.

